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Economic Transition and the Motherhood Wage Penalty in Urban 
China: Investigation Using Panel Data 
 
 
Abstract:  China’s  economic  transition  has  fundamentally  changed  the  mechanisms  for 
allocating and compensating labor. This paper investigates how the economic transition has 
affected the wage gap between mothers and childless women in urban China using panel data 
for the period 1990-2005. The results show that overall, mothers earned considerably less 
than childless women; additionally, the wage penalties for motherhood went up substantially 
from the gradualist reform period (1990-1996) to the radical reform period (1999-2005). The 
results also show that that although motherhood does not appear to have a significant wage 
effect for the state sector, it imposes substantial wage losses for mothers in the non-state 
sector. These findings suggest that the economic transition has shifted part of the cost of 
child-bearing and -rearing from the state and employers back to women in the form of lower 
earnings for working mothers.     
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1.    Introduction 
It is well recognized that women’s reproductive activities, typically child-bearing and 
-rearing, are crucial to human capabilities and well being. Caring for children, through its 
contribution to human and social capital investment, also plays a pivotal role in generating 
and sustaining economic growth (Folbre and Nelson 2000). However, women’s child-bearing 
and -rearing role tends to disadvantage them in the labor market and is a major factor in their 
weak position in terms of occupations and earnings (Elson 1999). Many empirical analyses of 
industrial countries find that mothers earn less than childless women.
1  In the literature, the 
wage losses associated with motherhood are termed “the motherhood wage penalty” (Budig 
and England, 2001).   
The motherhood wage penalty can be attributed to various factors. First, in the absence 
of regulations on maternity/paternity leave, child-bearing and -rearing  interrupts women’s 
labor force participation,  and women’s intermittent labor force participation reduces their 
human capital investment and therefore lowers their earnings (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; 
Jones and Makepeace, 1996; Royalty, 1998). Second, child-rearing often restricts mothers to 
types of paid work that are easier to combine with parenting, such as part-time work and 
home-based work (Becker, 1991; Polachek, 1981). Third, mothers may earn less because the 
time and energy devoted to childrearing inevitably reduce the amount of effort available for 
them to devote to paid work (Becker, 1991). Finally, believing that mothers always allow 
domestic responsibilities to interrupt their paid work, employers may discriminate against 
                                                        
1  A selective  list  of references includes Blau and  Kahn (1992), Korenman and  Neumark 
(1992), Waldfogel (1995, 1998a, 1998b, 1999), Jacobsen, Pearce III, and Rosenbloom (1999), 
Lundberg and Rose (2000), Budig and England (2001), Anderson, Binder and Krause (2002), 
Anderson, Binder and Krause (2003), and Sasse (2005) for  the  United  States; Waldfogel 
(1999), and Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel (1999) for the United Kingdom; Waldfogel (1999) and 
Phipps,  Burton  and  Lethbrigde  (2001)  for  Canada;  and  Waldfogel  (1999)  for  Australia, 
Germany  and  Finland.  However,  the  findings  on  the  motherhood  wage  penalty  are  not 
clear-cut. Albrecht et al. (1999) and Gupta and Smith (2002) find that motherhood has no 
effect on earnings in Sweden and Demark and attribute the absence of the motherhood wage 
penalty to the implementation of “family-friendly” policies in these countries.       
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mothers in hiring and promotion (Waldfogel, 1998b). The earnings losses associated with 
motherhood are an important source of gender earnings inequality (Sasser, 2005; Joshi et al., 
1999).   
This  paper  investigates  the  motherhood  wage  penalty  in  urban  China.  China  has 
undergone a transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy over the past 
three decades. This economic transition has brought about fundamental changes in the labor 
market,  reshaping  the  ways  in  which  women’s  reproductive  activities  are  valued  and 
rewarded. Although the gender implications of the economic transition have been the subject 
of considerable attention, much of the literature focuses on such factors as human capital 
investment,  sex  segregation,  and  discrimination,
2  paying  little  attention  to  the  changes 
associated with women’s reproductive activities. In this paper, we examine how the economic 
transition  has  affected  the  wage  gap  between  mothers  and  childless  women.  To  our 
knowledge,  the  present  paper  is  the  first  analysis  of  the  motherhood  wage  penalty  for 
transitional and developing countries.           
Our analysis is based on data from China’s Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The 
survey provides a national representative panel sample for the period from 1990 to 2005. 
Thus,  we are able to control  for time-invariant  unobserved  heterogeneity  among  women, 
which tends to bias the estimates of the motherhood effect in cross-section analyses. The rest 
of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  an  overview  of  the  economic 
transition  and  discusses  how  the  economic  transition  may  affect  the  wage  penalty  for 
motherhood.  Section  3  frames  the  hypotheses  and  introduces  empirical  methodologies. 
Section 4 describes the data. The empirical results are presented in Section 5. The paper is 
concluded with a summary of the main findings and a brief discussion of policy implications.   
 
                                                        
2  See Berik, Dong and Summerfield (2007) for a literature review on gender and economic 
transition in China.       5
2. Economic Transition and the Wage Penalty for Motherhood   
Under central planning, China’s urban labor market was known as an “iron rice bowl” 
with “everyone eating from one big pot”. Workers in state enterprises were employed for life 
and paid according to centrally regulated wage scales that were determined predominantly on 
the basis of workers’ education and seniority (Korzec, 1992). Inspired by the Marxist view of 
women’s emancipation as contingent on women’s participation in socialized labor, women’s 
full participation in the labor force played a key role in the leadership’s attempt to alleviate 
discrimination against women in society (Croll, 1983). Most working-age women in the 
urban sector were employed full-time after school graduation. To support working mothers, 
resources were devoted to a publicly funded childcare system that provided care to children 
from the earliest months of their lives until they entered primary schools (He and Jiang, 2008). 
In addition to on-site childcare, the employers also provided working mothers with nursing 
rooms for breast-feeding and paid maternity/family leave (Liu et al., 2008). These 
family-friendly policies made it easier for mothers to combine paid work with domestic 
responsibilities, thereby minimizing the degree to which child-bearing and -rearing 
interrupted women’s workforce participation. Although women remained the principal 
caregivers for children and other family members and their domestic burdens had the 
potential to leave them exhausted or distracted at work, the impact of work effort on earnings 
was limited because the wage differentials among workers were compressed (Meng and Kidd, 
1997). In essence, the costs of social reproduction under central planning were not solely 
borne by women; the state and employers footed part of the bill. As a result, the wage penalty 
for motherhood was to be small or nonexistent under central planning.   
In the late 1970s, China began to transform its economy into a market-oriented economy 
using  a  gradualist  approach.  In  the  first fifteen years  of  the  reform  process,  the  Chinese 
government  sought  reform  within  the  socialist  system,  directing  its  efforts  primarily  to   6
economic  decentralization,  improving  incentives  for  state  workers  and  managers,  and 
encouraging the development of non-state sectors. While the entry of rural township village 
enterprises  (TVEs),  private  firms,  and  foreign-invested  firms  greatly  eroded  the  share  of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in product markets, the public sector remained the principal 
employer  of  urban  workers,  accounting  for  more  than  three-quarters  of  total  urban 
employment  by  1995.  State  enterprises  continued  to  protect  workers  against  open 
unemployment and shoulder the responsibility of providing social benefits and services to 
employees.       
The pace of the economic reforms accelerated after Deng Xiaoping’s famous southern 
tour in 1992. The Chinese government initiated ownership reforms for public enterprises. As 
a  result,  a  large  number  of  SOEs  were  transformed  into  joint-stock  companies,  declared 
bankrupt, merged with other enterprises, or sold to private investors. In 1994, a new labor law 
was  passed  that  gave  employers  the  right  to  dismiss  workers.  In  1997,  the  Chinese 
government  launched  a  large-scale  labor  retrenchment  program  intended  to  revitalize  the 
ailing  SOE  sector.  The  SOE-sector  restructuring  efforts  have  fundamentally  changed  the 
landscape of the urban labor market, reducing the public sector’s share of employment from 
75.7% in 1995 to 33.4% in 2002 and putting an end to the state sector as the main source of 
urban employment (Dong and Xu, 2009).   
Of those seen in transition economies, China’s reforms are some of the most successful; 
they  have  produced  impressive  rates  of  economic  growth  and  massive  poverty  reduction 
(Chen  and  Ravallion,  2004).  However,  an  unintended  consequence  of  the  SOE-sector 
restructuring is that the reforms dismantled the institutional mechanisms that had internalized 
the costs of social reproduction and protected working mothers under central planning and 
did not create adequate measures to replace them (Ding et al., 2009). To be sure, the Chinese 
government  has  passed  a  series  of  regulations  to  protect  women  against  labor  market   7
discrimination in the post-reform era. For instance, the new labor law stipulates that women 
and men have equal employment rights, female employees are entitled to a 90-day maternity 
leave, and no employer should lay off female employees, lower their wages or unilaterally 
terminate  their  labor  contracts  for  reasons  of  marriage,  pregnancy,  maternity  leave,  or 
breastfeeding.  Although  these  “mother-friendly”  regulations  have  been  implemented  in 
government agencies, non-profits, public organizations (e.g., schools and hospitals), and large 
SOEs, they have been largely ignored by private employers (Liu, et al., 2008). There are no 
effective mechanisms to protect mothers from being adversely affected by market discipline 
and  discriminatory  practices  in  the  private  sector.  Moreover,  under  pressure  to  increase 
profits, enterprises are increasingly relying on piece-rate wages and performance-based bonus 
payments  to  elicit  effort  and  discourage  absenteeism.  These  competitive  compensation 
schemes  tend  to  disadvantage  mothers  because  child-bearing  and  -rearing  responsibilities 
decrease the time and energy that they have available for paid work and thereby hinder their 
job performance.
3     
Another  far-reaching  change  following  the  SOE  sector  restructuring  has  been  the 
substantial cutback in the support provided by the government and employers for childcare. 
With  the  drive  for  efficiency,  the  vast  majority  of  Chinese  enterprises  ceased  to  offer 
subsidized childcare to employees. According to the Chinese firm social responsibility survey 
undertaken in 2006, enterprises that still ran kindergartens accounted for less than 20% of 
SOEs and only 5.7% of all enterprises (Du and Dong, 2010). Publicly funded nurseries for 
children  aged  0-2  years  have  become  largely  non-existent  (Liu,  et  al.,  2008).  With  the 
                                                        
3  Using firm-level data for Chinese industry in the late 1990s, Dong and Zhang (2009) find 
that female workers are less productive than male workers in SOEs. Given that more than 
70% of female workers are mothers, as is evident in the CHNS data, child-bearing and 
-rearing may be a major culprit that lowers female workers’ productivity. Interestingly, the 
authors find that the relative wage of female to male workers was higher than their relative 
productivity at SOEs; thus, it can be argued that female workers in the SOE sector received 
wage premiums.         8
exception of employees of government agencies, non-profit public organizations (schools and 
hospitals), and large SOEs that have continued to provide subsidized childcare, urban parents 
have  had  to  rely  on  service-for-fee  childcare  programs  to  meet  their  needs.  Thus,  it  has 
become increasingly difficult for mothers with young children to participate in the labor force. 
Maurer-Fazio et al. (2009) present evidence that the labor force participation rate for urban 
women  with  preschool-age  children  fell  dramatically  between  1990  and  2000  and  that 
co-residence with grandparents became increasingly important for women looking to stay in 
the labor force. Du and Dong (2010) find that the sharpest decline in labor force participation 
occurred  among  women  with  children  younger  than  three  years  of  age.  Additionally,  a 
growing number of urban women have been pushed into the informal sector in which jobs are 
typically temporary or part-time, insecure, and low-paying (Cook and Wang 2010).     
Thus,  privatization  and  labor  market  deregulation  associated  with  the  SOE-sector 
restructuring are expected to widen the wage gap between mothers and childless women by 
increasing  birth-related  workforce  interruptions,  exacerbating  the  impediments  of 
child-bearing and -rearing to mothers’ opportunities for on-the-job training  or promotion, 
tightening the link between earnings and job performance, and pushing mothers into the types 
of jobs that offer more flexibility but lower pay.     
3. Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology   
In the remainder of the paper, we investigate the impact of the economic transition on 
the motherhood wage penalty by exploring the differences between two phases of economic 
transition  (the  gradualist  reform  period  (1990–1996)  and  the  radical  reform  period 
(1999–2005) and identifying the differences between the state sector and the non-state sector. 
Based  on  the  discussion  in  the  previous  section,  we  propose  three  hypotheses:  1.  in 
post-reform  urban  China,  wages  are  lower  for  mothers  than  for  childless  women;  2.  the   9
motherhood wage penalty  was  greater in the radical reform period than in the gradualist 
reform period; and 3. the wage penalty is greater in the non-state sector than the state sector.   
To test these hypotheses, we use the standard human capital wage equation modified to 
incorporate a motherhood dummy variable. We consider both annual wages and hourly wages 
given that the difference between the effects of motherhood effects for the two measures 
sheds  light  on  the  impact  of  motherhood  on  the  labor  hours  supplied.    An  empirical 
challenge to obtaining consistent estimates of the motherhood wage effect is the presence of 
unobserved individual characteristics that may simultaneously affect wages and child-bearing 
decisions. For example, women with lesser ability may be more likely to have children or to 
have children earlier.    If this is the case, the negative effect of motherhood on wages may be 
spurious due to unobserved heterogeneity.    To control for unobserved heterogeneity, we use 
the panel data regression model.    The model is as follows: 
it i it it it v Mother X w e b b + + + = 2 1 ln                     (1)   
where it w   is the individual i’s annual wage (or hourly wage) in period t and Xit is a vector of 
observable characteristics that are expected to affect wages.  it Mother   is a dummy variable 
equal to one for all  t ³ t if a woman gave birth to a child in yeart   and equal to zero 
otherwise. vi represents the unobserved, time-invariant characteristics of individual i, and εit 
is the random error.   
The motherhood dummy variable motherit is the variable of primary interest in the wage 
equation. Defined based on the first live birth a woman gave, motherit is an aggregate 
measure for motherhood for all women who have had child-bearing and -rearing experience, 
regardless of what age their children were or how many children they had at the time when 
the survey was done. The estimate for the motherhood variable takes into account not only 
the direct effect of bearing and raising young children but also its effect on the later years of a   10 
mother’s career.    Although the adverse effect of motherhood on a woman’s employment 
may be diminished or disappear as children grow up, its effect on earnings is long lasting; 
workforce interruption, missed training opportunities or delayed promotion in the early years 
of one’s career lower one’s earnings not just in the current period but in the later period. We 
do not control for the number of children because the vast majority of women in the sample 
have only one child due to the introduction of China’s only-child policy in the late 1970s.
4 
Thus, the coefficient of the motherhood dummy variable β2 measures the average effect of 
motherhood on a woman’s lifetime earnings. If motherhood has a negative effect on wages, 
we expect . 0 2 < b  
The  covariates  in  X  include  personal  characteristics  such  as  educational  attainment, 
potential work experience and its squared term, marital status, and job characteristics such as 
job  status  (full-time  versus  part-time),  occupations,  and  ownership  of  the  firms  in  which 
women were employed. We also control for co-residence with elderly parents. Under the 
influence of traditional Confucian culture, living with parents or parents-in-law is a common 
phenomenon in Chinese families. Living with elderly parents has two opposing effects on 
earnings. On the one hand, parents may help women to take care of children and alleviate 
their domestic work burden and may thereby have a positive impact on women’s earnings. 
On the other hand, parents may need caretaking by their daughters or daughters-in law, which 
may  thereby  increase  their  domestic  burdens  and,  consequently,  lower  their  earnings.  In 
addition, the covariate control variables also include dummy variables for time and regional 
variation.   
Eq. (1) is estimated using both random-effects and fixed-effects regression techniques. 
Empirically,  random-effects  and  fixed-effects  estimates  are  both  consistent,  but  only 
                                                        
4  In our sample, there are more women who have more than one child in the early sample 
period from 1990 to 1996 than in the later period from 1999 to 2005. As a result, our 
estimates may understate the impact of the economic transition on the motherhood wage 
penalty on a per child basis when comparing the two sample periods.     11 
random-effects estimates are efficient if the unobserved individual effects vi are uncorrelated 
with  any  explanatory  variable  including  motherit,  and  only  fixed-effects  estimates  are 
consistent if vi is correlated with any explanatory variable. For all models, the Hausman test 
is conducted to assess which model is adequate.   
One concern related to the estimation of Eq. (1) is selection bias, as perceived wage 
offers may affect women’s labor force participation decisions. If mothers whose motherhood 
penalty was expected to be larger were more likely to exit the labor force, our estimates 
would lead us to understate the motherhood penalty. Furthermore, if the deepening of the 
SOE reforms increased the motherhood penalty, inducing more mothers who were less 
productive to withdraw from the labor force, our estimates would also lead us to 
underestimate the impact of the economic transition. Thus, we tested the presence of selection 
bias using the approach developed by Wooldridge (1995) for panel data models. The test 
procedure is explained in the appendix. The test results (presented in Table A2 in the 
appendix) lead us not to reject the hull hypothesis that there is no selection bias in the annual 
wage earnings equation for the full sample period and the two sub-sample periods.       
                     
4. Data and Variables   
This research is based on data from the six waves (1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 
2006)  of  the  CHNS.
5  Each  survey  covers  about  3,800  households  and  about  14,000 
individuals  in  both  rural  and  urban  areas  from  nine  provinces:  Heilongjiang,  Liaoning, 
Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan, Guizhou, and Guangxi. We restrict our analysis to 
                                                        
5  The CHNS is jointly sponsored by the Carolina Population Center at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Institute of Nutrition and Food Hygiene of China and the 
Chinese Academy of Preventive Medicine. Detailed information about the CHNS is available 
at the website www.cpc.unc.edu/china/home.html. So far, the CHNS has collected data for 
1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006. The data collected in 1989 are excluded from 
the analysis because the information on some variables in that year is incompatible with the 
information gathered in the following six periods.     12 
women of prime age (between 17 and 45 years inclusive) in the urban sector, which includes 
cities and county centers and excludes villages in suburban and rural areas.
6  We further limit 
the  sample  to  women  with  positive  wage  earnings  for  at  least  two  waves  to  perform 
fixed-effects  estimation.  After  omitting  observations  with  missing  values,  the  sample  for 
analysis consists of 2,206 woman-year observations, and mothers account for 78% of the 
sample.   
We construct two measures for the dependent variable: the annual wage and hourly wage 
that the respondent earned in the year prior to the survey. The annual wage includes both 
regular wages and bonuses measured in yuan and deflated by the urban consumer price index 
with 2006 as the base year. The hourly wage is annual wages divided by the total number of 
work hours in the last year.
7  Both wage variables are in log form. Because the wage variables 
are based on the previous year’s earnings, the sample period under investigation is from 1990 
to 2005 and is divided into the gradualist reform period (from 1990 to 1996) and the radical 
reform period (from 1999 to 2005). We analyze the impact of the economic transition by 
exploring  the  differences  between  the  two  periods  and  between  the  state  and  non-state 
sectors.     
The definitions of the explanatory variables are given below.    The variable of primary 
interest, mother, is derived from the response to the questions related to birth history from the 
Survey  of  Ever-Married  Women  Under  Age  52—a  supplementary  survey  by  the  CHNS. 
Education is measured using two dummy variables – one for university graduates and one for 
high-school graduates. The reference group is those who did not graduate from high school. 
Work experience is calculated as age minus six and minus years of schooling because the 
                                                        
6  Rural villages are excluded because most married women in rural villages work primarily 
on family farms, and it is easier for mothers to combine work with childcare under 
self-employment than under wage employment.           
7  The total number of work hours is derived using the information on how many hours per 
day, days per week, and months per year each individual spent on paid work in the previous 
year as reported by the CHNS. We assume that each person worked four weeks per month.       13 
information  on  actual  experience  is  unavailable.  Marital  status  is  a  dummy  variable  for 
women who have been married. A dummy variable is included for those respondents who 
worked part-time, defined as less than 25 hours per week. Employer ownership types are 
measured using  three dummy variables for urban collectives, domestic private firms, and 
foreign  joint  ventures  and  foreign-invested  firms,  with  government  agencies,  public 
organization, and SOEs as the reference group. In addition, in the analysis that explores the 
differences  between  the  state  and  non-state  sectors,  government  agencies,  public 
organizations, and SOEs are assigned to the state sector, and the rest of the ownership types 
are included in the non-state sector.    The variables for occupations are dummy variables for 
a  woman’s  primary  occupation,  which  involves  a  range  of  job  titles  including  senior 
professional, professional, administrator and manager, office clerk, farmer, skilled worker, 
non-skilled worker, service worker, and driver. The descriptive statistics for the explanatory 
variables are presented in Table A1 in the appendix. 
5. Empirical Results   
5.1 Trends of Employment and Earnings 
Figures 1 to 3 include based information from the CHNS, depicting three major changes 
in the Chinese urban labor markets over the period of investigation. First, as Figure 1 shows, 
the labor force participation rates for women with young children fell sharply following the 
SOE sector restructuring in the late 1990s. The labor force participation rate for women with 
children under age 6 was 90.3% in 1990 and fell to 70.8% in 2005, and the larger decline is 
observed for women with children under age 3 (from 89.2% to 56.6%). The contrast between 
women with younger children and women with children under age 6 as a whole implies that 
many mothers entered or re-entered the labor market one or two years after giving birth to a 
child, bearing the double burden of working and taking care of pre-school-aged children.   14 
Secondly, based on Figure 2, we note that the proportion of women working part-time went 
up  by  an  appreciable  margin  and  the  magnitude  of  change  was  large  for  mothers  than 
childless  women,  although  the  proportion  of  part-time  workers  is  consistently  lower  for 
mothers  than  for  childless  women,  perhaps  reflecting  that  more  younger  women  took 
part-time  jobs.  Lastly,  as  shown  in  Figure  3,  the  proportion  of  women  working  in  the 
non-state sector increased markedly, from 35% in 1996 to approximately 50.0% in 2005.   
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for annual and hourly wages in log form by 
period  and  by  sector,  providing  a  broad  picture  of  the  changing  wage  differentials  for 
childless women and mothers over the period of investigation. It is noteworthy that the raw 
wage  gaps  between  the  two  types  of  women  are  attributable  not  only  to  the  potential 
motherhood effect but also to the experience effect. Given that the childless women in the 
sample are, on average, 11 years younger than the mothers and therefore have less experience, 
their wages should be lower as long as the negative motherhood effect does not outweigh the 
positive experience effect. In Table 1, we note that the annual and hourly wages of childless 
women  are  indeed  significantly  lower  than  those  of  mothers  for  the  full  sample  period. 
However, the wage differentials for the two types of women changed markedly from the 
1990-1996  period  to  the  1999-2005  period.    In  the  former  period,  the  pay  for  childless 
women  was  significantly  lower  than  that for  mothers  (by  25.4%  on  an annual  basis and 
24.3% on an hourly basis); in contrast, the wage differences for the period 1999-2005 are 
down to 7.7% and 4.6%, respectively, and they become statistically insignificant. Evidently, 
the wages of childless women grew faster than those of mothers during the post-restructuring 
period. A similar pattern of differences can also be observed when we compare the state and 
non-state sectors. In the state sector, the annual and hourly wages of childless women are 
significantly lower than those of mothers (by 31.8% on an annual basis and 29.2% on an 
hourly basis).    In contrast, the wage gaps in the non-state sector are much smaller (-5.8%   15 
and -3.6%, respectively), and none of the differences is statistically significant. Thus, relative 
to childless women, mothers appear to have fared poorly in the non-state sector relative to 
those in the state sector.         
5.2 Wage regression results   
The  wage  equation  in  (1)  is  first  estimated  for  the  full  sample  and  then  for  each 
sub-period using both random-effects and fixed-effects regression techniques. To discern how 
the change in employment patterns and occupational choices may affect the wage penalty for 
motherhood,  we  estimate  three  regression  specifications  by  introducing  the  variables  for 
part-time workers and the dummy variables for occupation incrementally for each of the two 
dependent  variables.  For  each  sub-period,  we also estimate a  modified  wage equation  in 
which a motherhood dummy variable and its interactive term with the dummy for the state 
sector are introduced to explore the difference between the state and non-state sectors. The 
Hausman  test  is  undertaken  to  determine  which  technique is  appropriate.  The  results  are 
reported in Tables 2-4.   
Table  2  presents  the  estimates  for  the  full  sample  period  from  1990  to  2005.    The 
Hausman  test  for  each  regression  presented  at  the  bottom  of  the  table  indicates  that  the 
individual  fixed  effects  are  endogenous  and,  thus,  that  the  fixed-effect  estimates  are 
consistent, whereas the random-effects estimates are not. Given the Hausman test results, the 
discussion below focuses on fixed-effects estimates. With respect to the motherhood wage 
effect, we note that all of the estimates have a negative sign and are significant at the 10% 
level  or  higher  for  annual  wages  and  at  the  levels  of  11%  to  12.6%  for  hourly  wages. 
Quantitatively,  introducing  the  part-time  variable  does  not  change  the  estimate  of  the 
motherhood  effect  for  both  annual  wages  and  hourly  wages,  and  further  controlling  for 
occupation  choices  increases  the  estimate  for  the  two  earnings  variables  rather  than 
decreasing it. Thus, occupational choices do not appear to have been a major channel through   16 
which child-bearing and -rearing adversely affected women’s earnings for the full sample 
period.  Based  on  the  three  specifications,  the  estimates  show  that  holding  other  factors 
constant, motherhood reduces the annual earnings of urban women by 21.7% to 22.4% and 
hourly earnings by 17.8% to 18.6%. The closeness of the estimates for annual wages and 
hourly  wages  suggests  that  while  a  decrease  in  the  labor  hour  supply  associated  with 
motherhood does not appear to be a major culprit that lowers mothers’ annual earnings, the 
gap in annual earnings between mothers and childless women is largely attributable to the 
difference  in  wage  rates.  Given  that  wage  rates  are  indicative  of  labor  productivity,  the 
aforementioned  results  suggest  that  child-bearing  and  -rearing  disadvantages  Chinese 
mothers primarily by lowering their productivity and hindering their work performance.       
The  results  for  other  control  variables  are  all  consistent  with  economic  intuition, 
reassuring  us  of  the  appropriateness  of  the  model  specification.  The  estimates  for  the 
educational  attainment  variables  show  that  education  has a  significant,  positive  effect  on 
earnings; for instance, women with a university degree earn about 50% to 56% more than 
women who did not graduate from high school. The two variables for experience are both 
highly significant, showing that earnings increase with experience but do so at a decreasing 
rate.  Moreover,  women  who  work  part-time  earn  significantly  less  than  those  who  work 
full-time on an annual basis, although the hourly wages are higher for the former than for the 
latter. Interestingly, the estimates for co-residence show that living with one’s father or father 
in-law has a significant, negative effect on women's earnings for both measures, whereas 
living with one’s mother or mother in-law has a positive effect on women's hourly wages 
(significant at the 10% level).    Women appear to be disadvantaged when they take care of 
both their children and their male elderly parents.             
The estimates of the two wage equations for the gradualist reform period (1990-1996) 
are  presented  in  Table  3.  The  Hausman  tests  lead  us  not  to  reject  the  hypothesis  that   17 
individual  fixed-effects  are  exogenous  for  most  specifications,
8   suggesting  that  the 
random-effects  estimates  are  efficient  and  consistent.  According  to  the  random-effects 
estimates, mothers earn slightly more than childless women according to both wage measures; 
however, the difference is statistically insignificant in all runs.     
The  estimates  of  the  wage  equations  for  the  radical  reform  period  (1999-2005)  are 
reported in Table 4. As also seen in the test results for the full sample presented in Table 2, 
the Hausman  test  leads us  to reject the random-effects  model, and hence, our discussion 
below focuses on the fixed-effects estimates.
9  We find that motherhood decreases women’s 
annual earnings by 34.3% (insignificant) and hourly wages by 45.1% (significant at the 5% 
level)  in  specification  (1),  in  which  the  part-time  and  occupational  variables  are  not 
accounted  for.  Introducing  the  part-time  variable  alone  or  together  with  occupational 
variables increases the motherhood wage effect from -34.3% to -40.5% (significant at the 
10%  level  in  both  cases)  for  annual  wages.  These  results  suggest  that  the  change  in 
employment  patterns  and  occupational  choices  did  not  cause  the  gap  in  annual  earnings 
between  mothers  and  childless  women  that  appeared  during  the  radical  reform  period. 
However, the estimated effect of motherhood on hourly wages falls from -45.1% to -40.8% 
(significant at the 10% level) when the part-time variable is accounted for, and the estimate 
rises slightly to -41.5% (significant at the 10% level) when occupational variables are added 
to  the  regression.  The  pattern  of  change  for  hourly  wages  indicates  that  part  of  the 
motherhood wage penalty that emerged during the radical reform period is attributable to the 
                                                        
8  The Hausman test has a negative score for one regression for annual wages and one for 
hourly wages; the results are not presented.     
9  The Hausman test results that individual fixed effects are exogenous to wages for the 
gradualist reform period and become endogenous for the radical reform period should not 
come as a surprise. Given that the Chinese urban labor regime remained administratively 
managed in the gradualist reform period and became marketed oriented in the radical reform 
period, holding other factors constant, unobserved individual characteristics should have no 
effect on women’s labor force participation and earnings in the former and begin to exert 
impacts on their decisions in the latter.   18 
growing number of mothers who worked part-time or took low-paying jobs. Notably, the 
effect of motherhood on annual earnings is smaller than that on hourly wages in all three 
specifications, suggesting that mothers may have worked more hours on average than did 
childless women during the radical reform period.   
The  significant  and  large  wage  gaps  between  mothers  and  childless  women  for  the 
radical reform period lend support to the conjecture that the privatization and labor market 
deregulation associated with  the  SOE-sector  restructuring  have  increased  the motherhood 
wage  penalty.  The  estimates  of  the  motherhood  wage  effect  for  post-restructuring  urban 
China are comparatively much larger than those for industrial countries, which are typically 
about 10% to 15% (Waldfogel 1998). There are two main reasons for the distinction between 
these different levels of the motherhood wage penalty.    First, as a “factory of the world”, 
China has a relatively large manufacturing sector that absorbs a larger share of the female 
labor  force  than  is  the  case  in  most  industrial  countries.  The  detrimental  effects  of 
child-bearing and -rearing on work performance are also greater in the manufacturing sector 
than in the service sector because the jobs in the former are physically more demanding than 
those in the latter. Secondly, the large wage penalty for motherhood in urban China relative to 
that  in  industrial  countries  may  also  imply  that  the  labor  market  is  more  competitive  in 
post-restructuring China than in many industrial countries. As a result, working mothers in 
China, as a group, received less state protection and support than did their counterparts in 
industrial countries.                     
Table 5 presents the estimates that indicate the contrast between the motherhood wage 
effects  in  the  state  and  non-state  sectors.  We  explore  this  difference  by  introducing  an 
interactive dummy variable for motherhood and the state sector. To streamline the exposition, 
we only present the estimates for the specification that includes part-time work, occupations, 
and all other explanatory variables. Consistent with the results presented in Tables 3 and 4,   19 
the Hausman test presented at the bottom of Table 5 does not lead us to reject the hypothesis 
that individual fixed effects are exogenous for the gradualist reform period but does lead us to 
reject  that  hypothesis  for  the  radical  reform  period.  Thus,  our  discussion  focuses  on  the 
random-effects estimates for the gradualist reform period and the fixed-effects estimates for 
the radical reform period.   
We note that motherhood has no significant effect on annual earnings or hourly wage 
rates for the gradualist reform period and that there is also no significant difference between 
the  effect  of  motherhood  on  wages  in  the  state  and  non-state  sectors  during  this  period 
according to the estimates of the interactive term. However, striking differences between the 
two  sectors  are  found  for  the  radical  reform  period.  Looking  at  the  estimates  of  the 
stand-alone  motherhood  variable,  we  note  that  motherhood  decreases  annual  earnings  by 
58.6% and hourly wages by 59.0% for women in the non-state sector and that both estimates 
are significant at the 1% level. The interactive dummy for motherhood and the state sector 
has a positive sign and is significant the 1% level. Summing the estimates of the stand-alone 
and interactive dummy variables for motherhood yields an estimated effect of motherhood of 
-15.3% in terms of annual earnings and -17.2% in terms of hourly wages for the state sector, 
but none of the effects are statistically significant. These estimates support the conjecture that 
women in the state sector have received more protection than their sisters in the non-state 
sectors. As a result, the motherhood wage penalty in the non-state sector is much larger than 
that in the state sector.   
6. Conclusions   
In this paper, we have analyzed the impact of the economic transition on the wage gap 
between mothers and childless women in urban China using panel data from a nationally 
representative survey. We compared the two phases of the transition: the gradualist phase 
(1990-1996) and the period of radical reforms (1999-2005). We also explored the difference   20 
between the state and non-state sectors. We found that the privatization and labor market 
deregulation that took place during the latter reform period have substantially increased the 
motherhood wage penalty and that the size of the penalty is much larger in the non-state 
sector than the state sector. The motherhood wage penalty that emerged in the radical reform 
period in China is markedly larger than that found in industrial countries. These findings 
suggest that the economic transition has shifted part of the cost of child-rearing from the state 
and employers back to women in the form of lower pay for working mothers. The plight of 
Chinese working mothers, especially those in the non-state sector, calls for feasible, effective 
policy  interventions  that  help  neutralize  the  adverse  labor  market  consequences  of 
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Fig 2. Proportion of mothers and childless women working parttime 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Annual Earnings and Hourly Earnings 
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Notes：Mean values are presented with standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance 
levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.     27 
Table 2 
Random-effects (RE) and Fixed-effects (FE) Estimates of the Earnings Equations, 1990-2005   
  Log Annual Earnings  Log Wage Rate 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE 
-0.112  -0.217*  -0.112*  -0.217*  -0.108*  -0.224**  -0.105*  -0.178  -0.104  -0.178  -0.0985  -0.186  Motherhood 
(0.068)  (0.117)  (0.062)  (0.112)  (0.063)  (0.113)  (0.063)  (0.117)  (0.064)  (0.117)  (0.064)  (0.116) 
0.623***  0.559***  0.582***  0.518***  0.519***  0.517***  0.619***  0.503***  0.638***  0.554***  0.559***  0.525***  Graduate from college 
(0.057)  (0.177)  (0.055)  (0.171)  (0.063)  (0.171)  (0.055)  (0.177)  (0.054)  (0.178)  (0.062)  (0.179) 
0.224***  0.167  0.207***  0.161  0.176***  0.161  0.226***  0.135  0.234***  0.143  0.194***  0.131  Graduate from Senior High 
School  (0.040)  (0.116)  (0.038)  (0.110)  (0.041)  (0.110)  (0.037)  (0.114)  (0.037)  (0.116)  (0.040)  (0.117) 
0.062***  0.096***  0.053***  0.091***  0.051***  0.092***  0.043***  0.081***  0.048***  0.087***  0.046***  0.083***  Experience 
(0.011)  (0.031)  (0.010)  (0.030)  (0.010)  (0.030)  (0.010)  (0.031)  (0.010)  (0.030)  (0.010)  (0.031) 
-0.127***  -0.172***  -0.106***  -0.162***  -0.103***  -0.164***  -0.083***  -0.131***  -0.093***  -0.143***  -0.090***  -0.142***  Experience
2 ￿100 
(0.026)  (0.049)  (0.026)  (0.049)  (0.026)  (0.049)  (0.026)  (0.050)  (0.025)  (0.048)  (0.025)  (0.048) 
-0.051  -0.138*  -0.048  -0.117  -0.053  -0.117  -0.033  -0.077  -0.032  -0.103  -0.038  -0.108  Married   
(0.046)  (0.077)  (0.046)  (0.078)  (0.046)  (0.077)  (0.049)  (0.077)  (0.048)  (0.076)  (0.047)  (0.075) 
Work part-time        -0.830***  -0.529***  -0.835***  -0.521***      0.408***  0.659***  0.402***  0.644*** 
      (0.118)  (0.163)  (0.116)  (0.165)      (0.116)  (0.167)  (0.115)  (0.171) 
Occupational variables    no  no  no  no  yes  yes  no  no  no  no  yes  yes 
-0.090**  -0.007  -0.091**  0.001  -0.067*  0.010  -0.096***  0.010  -0.096***  -0.000  -0.064*  0.014  Collective Enterprise 
(0.038)  (0.061)  (0.037)  (0.060)  (0.037)  (0.059)  (0.036)  (0.061)  (0.036)  (0.058)  (0.036)  (0.058) 
0.028  0.048  0.027  0.037  0.060  0.044  -0.132**  -0.063  -0.131**  -0.049  -0.071  -0.023  Private Enterprise 
(0.061)  (0.101)  (0.059)  (0.101)  (0.062)  (0.101)  (0.060)  (0.109)  (0.060)  (0.105)  (0.062)  (0.106) 
Joint venture and foreign  0.121  0.137  0.183*  0.134  0.191**  0.083  0.129  0.014  0.097  0.018  0.118  0.046   28 
invested enterprise    (0.118)  (0.195)  (0.098)  (0.173)  (0.097)  (0.177)  (0.094)  (0.187)  (0.094)  (0.173)  (0.094)  (0.191) 
-0.080  -0.233**  -0.098**  -0.251***  -0.102**  -0.256***  -0.118**  -0.329***  -0.110**  -0.307***  -0.117**  -0.316***  Live with Father or 
Father-in-law  (0.052)  (0.099)  (0.049)  (0.096)  (0.048)  (0.096)  (0.048)  (0.097)  (0.049)  (0.098)  (0.047)  (0.096) 
0.046  0.107  0.052  0.118  0.057  0.115  0.031  0.158*  0.028  0.145*  0.036  0.143*  Live with mother or 
mother-in-law  (0.051)  (0.082)  (0.048)  (0.080)  (0.048)  (0.080)  (0.049)  (0.085)  (0.049)  (0.086)  (0.048)  (0.085) 
Hausman Test    22.57    44.43    51.34    27.01    38.07    44.23   
P value  0.094    0.000    0.001    0.029    0.002    0.005   
Overall R-squared  0.408  0.352  0.457  0.393  0.463  0.392  0.479  0.398  0.484  0.397  0.494  0.415 
Between R-squared  0.374  0.305  0.444  0.359  0.449  0.354  0.476  0.370  0.476  0.363  0.484  0.380 
Observations  2,212  2,212  2,212  2,212  2,212  2,212  2,212  2,212  2,212  2,212  2,212  2,212 
Notes：Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The 
estimates for province and time dummy variables that are included in all regressions and occupational variables that are included in equation (3) are omitted to 
streamline the presentation. 
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Table 3 
Random-effects and Fixed-effects Estimates of the Earnings Equations, 1990-1996 
  Log Annual Earnings  Log Wage Rate 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE 
Motherhood  0.027  -0.197  0.048  -0.145  0.057  -0.123  0.024  -0.138  0.014  -0.176  0.024  -0.149 
  (0.073)  (0.149)  (0.070)  (0.146)  (0.070)  (0.146)  (0.069)  (0.143)  (0.069)  (0.144)  (0.069)  (0.142) 
Graduate from college  0.307***  0.405  0.285***  0.346  0.210***  0.344  0.323***  0.426*  0.336***  0.469*  0.238***  0.440* 
  (0.055)  (0.277)  (0.053)  (0.267)  (0.059)  (0.277)  (0.052)  (0.252)  (0.053)  (0.246)  (0.058)  (0.250) 
0.107***  0.232  0.095***  0.197  0.057  0.204  0.133***  0.192  0.140***  0.218  0.092***  0.209  Graduate from senior high 
school  (0.036)  (0.171)  (0.035)  (0.166)  (0.037)  (0.173)  (0.034)  (0.161)  (0.034)  (0.158)  (0.036)  (0.163) 
Experience  0.035***  0.073  0.030***  0.052  0.026**  0.050  0.029***  0.063  0.032***  0.078  0.027**  0.065 
  (0.012)  (0.060)  (0.011)  (0.056)  (0.011)  (0.057)  (0.011)  (0.052)  (0.011)  (0.051)  (0.011)  (0.051) 
Experience
2 ￿100  -0.055*  -0.095  -0.045  -0.072  -0.037  -0.060  -0.042  -0.067  -0.048*  -0.083  -0.038  -0.059 
  (0.029)  (0.074)  (0.027)  (0.070)  (0.027)  (0.071)  (0.027)  (0.072)  (0.027)  (0.069)  (0.026)  (0.070) 
Married    -0.089  -0.199*  -0.104*  -0.159  -0.108*  -0.145  -0.100*  -0.116  -0.092  -0.145  -0.094*  -0.148 
  (0.061)  (0.120)  (0.058)  (0.117)  (0.058)  (0.119)  (0.057)  (0.118)  (0.057)  (0.119)  (0.057)  (0.119) 
Work part-time        -0.888***  -0.707***  -0.878***  -0.698***      0.504***  0.516**  0.515***  0.472** 
      (0.159)  (0.239)  (0.158)  (0.255)      (0.137)  (0.211)  (0.135)  (0.219) 
Occupational variables    no  no  no  no  yes  yes  no  no  no  no  yes  yes 
Collective enterprise  -0.084**  0.002  -0.092**  0.017  -0.070*  0.007  -0.104***  0.037  -0.101***  0.026  -0.073**  0.028 
  (0.039)  (0.078)  (0.038)  (0.077)  (0.038)  (0.076)  (0.037)  (0.078)  (0.037)  (0.076)  (0.036)  (0.075) 
Private enterprise  0.442***  0.482***  0.455***  0.489***  0.487***  0.491***  0.290***  0.363**  0.282***  0.359**  0.333***  0.407*** 
  (0.084)  (0.155)  (0.082)  (0.155)  (0.087)  (0.159)  (0.085)  (0.156)  (0.083)  (0.144)  (0.087)  (0.152) 
Joint venture and foreign  0.470***  0.589**  0.423***  0.496**  0.416***  0.424*  0.297*  0.212  0.319*  0.279  0.306*  0.371   30 
invested enterprise    (0.133)  (0.275)  (0.133)  (0.224)  (0.139)  (0.237)  (0.167)  (0.278)  (0.166)  (0.244)  (0.179)  (0.259) 
-0.057  -0.232**  -0.057  -0.236**  -0.068  -0.233**  -0.058  -0.276***  -0.057  -0.273**  -0.070  -0.277***  Live with Father or 
Father-in-law  (0.055)  (0.103)  (0.055)  (0.104)  (0.054)  (0.103)  (0.054)  (0.107)  (0.054)  (0.106)  (0.053)  (0.105) 
-0.005  -0.033  -0.009  -0.042  0.000  -0.043  -0.021  -0.004  -0.019  0.002  -0.008  0.003  Live with mother or 
mother-in-law  (0.053)  (0.113)  (0.052)  (0.112)  (0.052)  (0.116)  (0.051)  (0.117)  (0.0511)  (0.118)  (0.050)  (0.123) 
Hausman test    12.08    -    21.39    15.33    14.35    -   
P value  0.521    -    0.436    0.287    0.424    -   
Between R-squared  0.273  0.175  0.336  0.245  0.352  0.236  0.369  0.215  0.387  0.211  0.410  0.219 
Overall R-squared  0.262  0.193  0.312  0.254  0.327  0.250  0.345  0.233  0.359  0.226  0.379  0.240 
Observations  1,253  1,253  1,253  1,253  1,253  1,253  1,253  1,253  1,253  1,253  1,253  1,253 
Notes：Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The 
estimates for province and time dummy variables that are included in all regressions and occupational variables that are included in equation (3) are omitted to 
streamline the presentation. The Hausman test scores for equation (2) of log annual earnings and equation (3) of log wage rate are omitted, which have a negative 
value.       31 
Table 4 
RE and FE Estimates of the Earnings Equations, 1999-2005 (robust) 
  Log Annual Earnings  Log Wage Rate 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE 
Motherhood  -0.173  -0.343  -0.196**  -0.405*  -0.190*  -0.405*  -0.177*  -0.451**  -0.169*  -0.408*  -0.160  -0.415** 
  (0.115)  (0.271)  (0.099)  (0.222)  (0.100)  (0.214)  (0.097)  (0.204)  (0.099)  (0.225)  (0.099)  (0.209) 
Graduate from college  0.753***  0.652*  0.705***  0.612*  0.648***  0.567*  0.752***  0.515  0.769***  0.543  0.692***  0.464 
  (0.093)  (0.334)  (0.088)  (0.319)  (0.101)  (0.312)  (0.088)  (0.344)  (0.087)  (0.346)  (0.100)  (0.357) 
0.366***  0.248  0.342***  0.249  0.319***  0.248  0.353***  0.174  0.362***  0.173  0.327***  0.157  Graduate from senior high 
school  (0.077)  (0.267)  (0.071)  (0.244)  (0.075)  (0.242)  (0.071)  (0.263)  (0.070)  (0.267)  (0.074)  (0.273) 
Experience  0.081***  0.104*  0.067***  0.090  0.070***  0.084  0.051***  0.063  0.056***  0.073  0.058***  0.062 
  (0.017)  (0.063)  (0.016)  (0.059)  (0.016)  (0.060)  (0.016)  (0.066)  (0.016)  (0.065)  (0.016)  (0.065) 
Experience
2￿100  -0.187***  -0.154  -0.149***  -0.126  -0.156***  -0.118  -0.110***  -0.085  -0.124***  -0.105  -0.128***  -0.090 
  (0.043)  (0.117)  (0.041)  (0.111)  (0.041)  (0.112)  (0.042)  (0.118)  (0.041)  (0.115)  (0.041)  (0.116) 
Married    -0.047  -0.128  -0.042  -0.104  -0.054  -0.134  -0.001  -0.026  -0.002  -0.043  -0.017  -0.079 
  (0.061)  (0.111)  (0.063)  (0.115)  (0.062)  (0.119)  (0.069)  (0.119)  (0.066)  (0.112)  (0.065)  (0.112) 
Work part-time        -0.876***  -0.752***  -0.888***  -0.830***      0.325**  0.525  0.308*  0.445 
      (0.149)  (0.256)  (0.146)  (0.259)      (0.161)  (0.349)  (0.158)  (0.348) 
Occupational variables    no  no  no  no  yes  yes  no  no  no  no  yes  yes 
Collective enterprise  -0.175**  -0.192  -0.147*  -0.159  -0.110  -0.125  -0.132  -0.160  -0.142*  -0.183  -0.0948  -0.160 
  (0.077)  (0.150)  (0.077)  (0.152)  (0.080)  (0.150)  (0.080)  (0.154)  (0.078)  (0.150)  (0.079)  (0.147) 
Private enterprise  -0.121  -0.220  -0.132*  -0.261*  -0.0960  -0.215  -0.284***  -0.299*  -0.280***  -0.271*  -0.206**  -0.220 
  (0.074)  (0.148)  (0.070)  (0.145)  (0.080)  (0.148)  (0.070)  (0.161)  (0.069)  (0.157)  (0.080)  (0.156) 
Joint venture and foreign  -0.077  -0.182  0.035  -0.043  0.061  0.069  0.023  -0.013  -0.016  -0.110  0.023  -0.010   32 
invested enterprise  (0.150)  (0.192)  (0.127)  (0.156)  (0.128)  (0.143)  (0.114)  (0.200)  (0.117)  (0.191)  (0.120)  (0.169) 
0.017  -0.038  -0.025  -0.049  -0.024  -0.028  -0.067  -0.160  -0.052  -0.152  -0.056  -0.158  Live with father or 
father-in-law  (0.091)  (0.257)  (0.086)  (0.260)  (0.085)  (0.255)  (0.087)  (0.296)  (0.086)  (0.291)  (0.084)  (0.281) 
0.023  -0.010  0.050  0.028  0.059  0.038  0.006  0.071  -0.004  0.045  0.007  0.067  Live with mother or 
mother-in-law  (0.082)  (0.131)  (0.077)  (0.118)  (0.076)  (0.119)  (0.082)  (0.135)  (0.081)  (0.140)  (0.079)  (0.133) 
Hausman test  145.89    158.73    193.28    72.54    75.35    94.06   
P value  0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   
Observations  959  959  959  959  959  959  959  959  959  959  959  959 
Between R-squared  0.187  0.061  0.266  0.143  0.270  0.147  0.219  0.125  0.226  0.112  0.234  0.105 
Overall R-squared  0.201  0.081  0.275  0.162  0.282  0.173  0.223  0.133  0.230  0.121  0.243  0.122 
Observations  959  959  959  959  959  959  959  959  959  959  959  959 
 
Notes：Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The 
estimates for province and time dummy variables that are included in all regressions and occupational variables that are included in equation (3) are omitted to 
streamline the presentation. The Hausman test scores for equation (2) of log annual earnings and equation (3) of log wage rate are omitted, which have a negative   
value.       33 
Table 5 
Random-effects and Fixed-effects Estimates of Ownership Regressions,   
1990-1996 and 1999-2005 
  Log Annual Earnings  Log Wage Rate 
1990-1996  1999-2005  1990-1996  1999-2005 
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Hausman test   
P value   
19.78 






(0.40)   
 
87.33 
(0.00)   
 
Between R-squared  0.305  0.184  0.280  0.121  0.385  0.189  0.246  0.077 
Overall R-squared  0.284  0.201  0.289  0.143  0.357  0.211  0.251  0.093 
Observations  1253  1253  959  959  1253  1253  959  959 
Notes：Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Province, 
time and occupational dummy variables    are included in all regressions and the estimates are omitted to streamline the presentation.   
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Appendix:    Test for sample selection bias in the fixed-effects model   
A sample selection test for the fixed-effects model is performed following the procedure 
developed by Wooldridge (1995). We first derive the inverse Mills ratio from a reduced-form 
selection probit equation below:   
] 0 [ 1 2 > + = it t i it x s e g                   (A1) 
where s is a dummy variable equal to one for those with positive wages and zero otherwise; xi 
= (xit,
-
i x ) includes the value of an explanatory variable for individual i in period t and its 
mean value for individual i over T periods for all explanatory variables, and ε is the error 
term.
10  The explanatory variables include education, age and its squared term, marital status, 
unearned income, co-residence with elderly parents or parents in-law, and province and year 
dummy variables.      Following Gupta and Smith (2002), we introduce unearned income that 
is  excluded  from  the  earnings  equation  in  the  selection  equation  for  identification.    We 
derive the inverse Mills ratio by estimating the selection equation (A1) via pooled probit 
across i and t and then include the inverse Mills ratio in the fixed-effects earnings equation. 
According to Wooldridge (1995), the t statistic for the inverse Mills ratio in the fixed-effects 
earnings equation provides a valid test of sample selection bias regardless of whether A1 is 
the proper model of sample selection. We perform the test for annual earnings for the full 
sample period and for the two sub-periods and present the test results in Table A2.    We note 
that  in  all  cases,  the  inverse  Mills  ratio  is  statistically  insignificant;  we  also  note  that 
including the inverse Mills ratio does not change the estimates of the motherhood wage effect 
very  much.  Thus,  sample  selection  does  not  appear  to  be  a  serious  concern  given  that 
unobserved individual fixed effects are controlled for.       
                                                        
10  The specification follows the Mundlak (1978) approach, which uses 
-
i x to control 
individual fixed effects for the selection equation.       36 
Table A1 
Summary Statistics of the Explanatory Variables   
  Full Sample  Childless 




























































































Observations    2,206  483  1723 
Notes: The statistics for province, year, and occupation dummy variables are omitted to streamline the 
presentation.     37 
Table A2 
Selection Bias Test of Log Annual Earnings (FE)   
  Log Annual Earnings 









































































Foreign joint venture and 














(0.265)   38 








Overall R-squared  0.395  0.223  0.153 
Observations  2206  1173  959 
Notes：Heteroscedasticity-robust  standard  errors  reported  in  parentheses.  ***,  **,  and  *  denote 
significance  levels  of  1%,  5%  and  10%,  respectively.  Province  and  time  dummy  variables  are 
included in all regressions and their estimates are omitted to streamline the presentation.   
 